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WHEN TUNA STILL ISN’T ALWAYS TUNA:
FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY REGULATORY REGIME
CONTINUES TO INADEQUATELY ADDRESS
SEAFOOD FRAUD
Stephen Wagner∗

In 2012 alone, Americans consumed approximately 4.5 billion
pounds of seafood, over 90% of which was imported.1 Simply put,
Americans eat a lot of seafood, with upwards of 500 different species
available to satiate the demand.2 Consequently, imported and domestic
seafood in the United States is a thriving 80.2 billion dollar market,3 with
certain highly desired species of fish fetching steep prices.4
One fundamental assumption of the consumer-driven market is that
the label on the seafood correctly identifies the species of seafood,
thereby, among other things, justifying the market price. It is
increasingly clear, however, that this assumption is often not the case for
seafood: many consumers are awakening to the upsetting and dangerous
reality that the premium-priced, ecologically-certified, wild Atlantic
salmon they ordered at the restaurant or picked up at the grocer is
perhaps the much less-expensive and arguably unsustainable farm-raised
∗ J.D., magna cum laude, University of Maine School of Law, 2015; B.A. College
of the Atlantic, 2011.
1. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV. (NMFS), NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN. (NOAA), FISHERIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 2012 3-4 (Alan Lowther, ed. 2013),
available at http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/commercial-fisheries/fus/fus12/.
2. OR. STATE UNIV., CORNELL UNIV., UNIVS. OF DEL., R.I., FLA. & CAL. & THE CMTY.
SEAFOOD INITIATIVE, SEAFOOD CHOICES: OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. SEAFOOD SUPPLY 1
(2011), available at http://seafoodhealthfacts.org /pdf/seafood-choices-overview.pdf .
3. Benjamin Friedman, Mystery Fish, CONSUMER REPORTS, Dec. 2011, available at http://
www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-archive/2011/december/food/fake-fish/overview
/index.htm.
4. See, e.g., Patrick Boehler, Japan: World’s Most Expensive Fish Sold for $1.8
Million, TIME, Jan. 7, 2013, available at http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/01/07/japanworlds-most-expensive-fish-sold-for-1-8-million/ (“a 222-kilogram bluefin tuna was sold
at Tokyo’s Tsukiji market for an all-time high of 155.4 million yen, or 1.8 million
dollars”).
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salmon;5 or that their sashimi ahi tuna, prized for its delicate flavor and
light flesh, is potentially the snake mackerel, a species of fish whose oils
are known to cause severe gastrointestinal problems.6
The dilemma consumers face is seafood fraud:7 the substitution,
misrepresentation, or mislabeling of a species of seafood that has become
progressively prevalent with the increase of globalized trade, consumer
demand for seafood, increased consumer demand for sustainably-sourced
seafood, and the availability of reliable and inexpensive DNA technology
that can test the flesh of the food item to determine its species and
origin.8 Whether seafood fraud is intentional or unintentional, it is an
economic, environmental, and food safety harm. Particularly because of
the severity of the threat to food safety, this comment examines the
adequacy of the existing federal regulatory regime addressing seafood
fraud, specifically focusing on potential impacts of the Food Safety and
Modernization Act (FSMA) on seafood fraud.
Part I of this comment explores what exactly seafood fraud is and the
negative impacts this has on the economy, the environment, and human
health. Part II lays out the different federal agencies responsible for
regulating seafood fraud and briefly analyzes the agencies’ attempts to
address the problem. Part III summarizes the origin and scope of FSMA
and highlights potential new powers and opportunities it gives the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) for addressing seafood fraud. Finally,
part IV concludes that even with FSMA, there remain significant
problems with the current food safety regime that inhibit real action on
5. See, e.g., Sarah Zielinski, Seafood Sleuthing Reveals Pervasive Fish Fraud in New
York City, NPR: THE SALT (Dec. 11, 2012, 5:10 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt
/2012/12/11/166981454/seafood-sleuthing-reveals-pervasive-fish-fraud-in-new-york-city.
6. KIMBERLY WARNER, WALKER TIMME, BETH LOWELL, & MICHAEL HIRSHFIELD,
OCEANA STUDY REVEALS SEAFOOD FRAUD NATIONWIDE 16 (2013), available at
http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/reports/National_Seafood_Fraud_Testing_Results_FI
NAL.pdf (“Escolar, or oilfish (Lepidocybium flavobrunneum), is not actually a tuna
species at all, but is instead a snake mackerel that contains a naturally occurring toxin,
gempylotoxin. This toxin can cause mild to severe gastrointestinal problems even for
some who eat only a few ounces of the fish. Because of the health problems associated
with escolar, Italy and Japan have banned it, several other countries have issued health
advisories for it and the FDA advises against the sale of it in the U.S.”).
7. Author uses the term seafood “fraud” in the non-tortious sense, acknowledging
that not all misrepresentation or species substitution constitutes intentional fraud.
8. Yale Sch. of Forestry & Envtl. Studies, A New Fish DNA Test Could Help in the
Fish Against Illegal Fishing, ENV’T 360 DIG., ( May 13, 2011), available at
http://e360.yale.edu/digest/a_new_fish_dna_test_couldhelp_in_the_fight_against_illegal_
fishing/2942/ (“An international consortium has developed a DNA test that can trace the
origin of fish and fish products, an innovation that could improve enforcement of marine
fisheries laws and reduce overfishing worldwide.”).
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addressing seafood fraud on the federal level and discusses other
potential alternative approaches, including Senator (then Representative)
Ed Markey’s recently re-introduced Safety And Fraud Enforcement for
Seafood Act (SAFE Seafood Act).
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF SEAFOOD FRAUD
Many recent studies and investigations, by both government and
non-profit watch groups, have found extensive fraud, misrepresentation,
and species substitution in fish and other forms of seafood. From 2010
to 2012, Oceana,9 a non-profit organization advocating for international
ocean conservation, conducted one of the largest of such investigations,
gathering more than 1,200 seafood samples from 647 retail outlets in 21
states to determine if they were honestly labeled. 10 Oceana’s DNA
testing found that one-third of the samples analyzed were mislabeled
according to FDA guidelines, with red snapper and tuna having the
highest rates of fraud.11 Further, Oceana found that 44 percent of retail
outlets sampled sold food that tested positive for fraud; it also identified
“which types were the worst (sushi venues) and best (grocery stores) in
honestly labeling seafood according to federal guidelines, with these
patterns being repeated everywhere [it] sampled in sufficient numbers.”12
In 2012, the Consumers Union of the United States published a
report in the Consumer Reports magazine about an investigation by The
National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)13 into alleged
seafood fraud.14 NOAA sent out both fresh and frozen samples obtained
9. OCEANA, Protecting the World’s Oceans, http://oceana.org/en/about-us/what-wedo (“Oceana, founded in 2001, is the largest international organization focused solely on
ocean conservation”) (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
10. WARNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 4; Gretchen Goetz, Looking Upstream: Seafood
Traceability in a Global Economy, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (May 20, 2013),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/05/looking-upstream-seafood-traceability-in-aglobal-economy/#.VPCndodxtUQ.
11. WARNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 25.
12. Id. (explaining that this may be due to the stricter private regulations and practices
addressing seafood fraud at large, chain grocery stores).
13. NMFS Seafood Inspection Program is responsible for the development and
advancement of commercial grade standards for fishery products, health and sanitation
standards in the industry, and for inspecting, evaluating, analyzing, grading, and
certifying services to interested parties. Memorandum of Understanding Between FDA
and NOAA on Seafood Inspections (Nov. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/PartnershipsCollaborations/MemorandaofUnderstanding
MOUs/DomesticMOUs/ucm201263.htm; NOAA, Seafood Inspection Program,
http://www.seafood.nmfs.noaa.gov/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).
14. Friedman, supra note 3, at 11.
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from a retail location to an outside lab for DNA testing, where
“researchers extracted genetic material from each sample [of fourteen
types of fish] and compared the genetic sequences against standardized
gene fragments that identify its species in much the same way that
criminal investigators use genetic fingerprinting.”15 The results found
“more than one-fifth of 190 pieces of seafood [NOAA] bought at retail
stores and restaurants in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut were
mislabeled as different species of fish, incompletely labeled,
or misidentified by employees.”16
Members of the press have also not been shy about shining a light on
seafood fraud, even conducting investigations of their own.17
When Consumer Reports tested 23 supposedly wild-caught salmon fillets
bought nationwide in 2005-2006, only 10 were wild salmon and the rest
were farmed.18 In 2004, University of North Carolina scientists found 27
percent fish labeled red snapper was not in fact red snapper.19 In 2008,
the Chicago Sun-Times tested fish at 17 sushi restaurants and found that
fish being sold as red snapper actually was mostly tilapia.20
A 2011 investigation of fish from over 134 restaurants in
Massachusetts by the Boston Globe “showed that Massachusetts
consumers routinely and unwittingly overpay for less desirable,
sometimes undesirable, species – or buy seafood that is simply not what
it is advertised to be. In many cases, the fish was caught thousands of
miles away and frozen, not hauled in by local fishermen, as the menu
claimed.” 21 In its investigation, confirming the results of Oceana and
NOAA, the Boston Globe found all 23 white tuna samples were escolar,
not white tuna, and 24 out of 26 red snapper sampled was actually a less-

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weise, Something Fishy? Counterfeit Foods Enter the U.S.
Market, USA TODAY (Jan. 23, 2009), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/200901-19-fake-foods_N.htm.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Jean Abelson & Beth Daley, On the Menu, But Not on Your Plate: A Globe
Investigation Found Fish Bought At Restaurants Across the Regions Was Mislabeled
About Half the Time. Sometimes it Was Innocent Error, But Often the Switch Was
BOS.
GLOBE,
Oct.
23,
2011,
Deliberate,
Driven
by
Profits,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/2011
/10/22/dnatest/NDbXGXdPR6O37mXRSVPGlL/story.html [hereinafter Abelson 2011].
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prized species.22 Despite legislative action on the state level following
this report, a follow-up report a year later revealed similar results.23
Disturbing as this may be, adulteration or misrepresentation of food
has been around for as long was people have purchased food; be it lead
in water or chalk and bones in bread, fraudulently misrepresented or
adulterated food products have a long history. 24
However, there are not many recorded instances of adulteration of
seafood.25 This is likely because, prior to modern technology and global
trade, seafood consumption was largely confined to coastal fishing
communities, where consumers bought directly from the fisherman and
could probably themselves identify the species of fish.26
With increased globalization and urbanization, as well as advanced
technology allowing transportation of seafood beyond the coastline,
seafood is more susceptible to such tactics. In Swindled: The
Dark History of Food Fraud, From Poisoned Candy to Counterfeit
Coffee, author Bee Wilson theorizes that the emergence of modern food
fraud can be traced to the impact of the industrial revolution and laissezfaire economics on the food industry in 19th century England.27 She
explains that, as the medieval guild system gave way to urban merchants,
caveat emptor became the governing rule for the buying and selling of
food, thus “[foisting] huge responsibility on a population that lacked
even basic democratic rights.”28 Wilson similarly contends that food
fraud and adulteration in the United States was exasperated by the
advancement in food science and shift in food production from home to
factory.29
22. Id.
23. Jean Abelson & Beth Daley, Many Mass. Restaurants Still Serve Mislabeled Fish,
BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 2, 2012, http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2012/12/02
/dnasidebar/SAe6PdZMRqi6mZUDOdWz7M/story.html [hereinafter Abelson 2012].
24. See generally BEE WILSON, SWINDLED: THE DARK HISTORY OF FOOD FRAUD, FROM
POISONED CANDY TO COUNTERFEIT COFFEE (Princeton University Press, ed. 2008) (an
excellent resource that explores the history of food fraud, from the leaded wine of the
ancient Romans to modern food frauds like the Chinese milk powder scandals and
dubious organic food labels) [hereinafter Wilson].
25. See Abelson 2012, supra note 23 (“Throughout much of the last century, the cold
waters off New England supplied fresh fish that was delivered daily to Massachusetts
restaurants and other businesses.”).
26. Id.
27. WILSON, supra note 24, at 19-34.
28. Id. at 95.
29. See Michael T. Roberts, Cheaters Shouldn’t Prosper and Consumers Shouldn’t
Suffer: The Need for Government Enforcement Against Economic Adulteration of 100%
Pomegranate Juice and Other Imported Food Products, 6 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 189, 204-
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Today, economically-motivated adulteration of food can be defined
as the “fraudulent addition of nonauthentic substances or removal or
replacement of authentic substances without the purchasers’ knowledge
for economic gain of the seller.”30 Food fraud is a broader term “that
encompasses the deliberate substitution, addition, tampering, or
misrepresentation of food, food ingredients, or food packaging, or false
or misleading statements made about a product for economic gain.”31
Seafood fraud is a form of food fraud. It can take the form of species
substitution,32 whereby a lower-quality and less expensive fish is
mislabeled as a more desirable and more expensive species.33 Fillers and
other substitutes may be used on processed seafood products for similar
reasons.34 Also, seafood fraud may include transshipment to avoid
duties,35 over-treating,36 short-weighting, and other forms of mislabeling
and misrepresentation.37 However, this fraud is not always, intentional.38
06 (2010) (laying out a history of the U.S. regulatory response to food adulteration at the
turn of the 20th century).
30. Jeffery C. Moore, John Spink & Markus Lipp, Development and Application of a
Database of Food Ingredient Fraud and Economically Motivated Adulteration from 1980
to 2010, 77 J. FOOD SCI. R118, R118 (quoting J. Devries, US Pharmacopeia’s Food
Ingredients Intentional Adulterants Advisory Panel. Presented at USP’s 2009 Food
Ingredients
Stakeholder
Forum,
http://www.usp.org/pdf/EN/stakeholderforum
/foodadditives/Aug2009/2009-08-04FISFPresentationspdf.pdf(slides 80-91)).
31. John Spink, Defining Food Fraud and the Chemistry of the Crime, in IMPROVING
IMPORT FOOD SAFETY 195, 196 (Wayne Ellefson, Zach Lonra, Darryl Sulliven, eds.
2013).
32. GAO-09-258, SEAFOOD FRAUD 8 (2009) [hereinafter GAO-09-258] (species
substitution occurs when “participants in the seafood supply chain . . . label a species of
seafood as another species. Typically, a lower-market-value species is labeled as a
higher-market-value species to realize a larger profit. This results in consumers paying
too much for the product.”).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 8-9 (“Foreign producers may ship seafood products on route to the United
States through a third country to avoid import duties by labeling the product’s country of
origin as the third country and also to avoid regulatory controls such as FDA import
alerts.”).
36. Id. (explaining over-treating is a technique whereby processors may, for example,
over-bread prepared seafood products, use water-retaining chemicals, or over-glaze with
an ice covering to artificially increase the weight of seafood products without indicating
the true net weight of the seafood on the label.).
37. Spink, supra note 31, at 9 (giving as examples the providing wrong information
and commingling of two or more different products with different values that are then
sold as one product at the higher price).
38. Goetz, supra note 10 (quoting LeeAnn Applewhite, CEO of Applied Food
Technologies, “It’s extremely complicated because fishermen go out, and grouper don’t
swim in one place all by themselves and cod in another place all by themselves,” she
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Rather a species could merely be mislabeled, incompletely labeled, or
misidentified by employees at retail stores or restaurants.39 This is
distinct from such condoned practices in the seafood industry such as the
re-branding of less desirable species, which is often harmless to the
health and safety of consumers and perhaps beneficial in replenishing
depleted fish stocks.40
A. The Three Major Effects of Seafood Fraud
Although most intentional seafood fraud may be motivated purely by
economic gain,41 and so is consequently not thought of beyond its
economic harm dimensions, the intentional or unintentional effects are
broader.
1. Economic Concerns
Seafood fraud is an economic harm. The consumer is often
negatively impacted because when one higher-valued species is
substituted for another, the consumer is nearly always the one paying the
price.42 “[S]wapping a lower-cost fish for a higher-value one is like
ordering a filet mignon and getting a hamburger instead.”43
For example, several investigations found seafood fraud is very
common in sushi restaurants where favored species can fetch exorbitant
prices.44 One common example is the substitution of the more expensive
explained. “You have all these species swimming together and they catch thousands of
fish on some of the big boats. They look alike, they’re in the same place, and once they’re
filleted, nobody can tell the difference.”).
39. Id.
40. Andrea Migone & Michael Howlett, From Paper Trails to DNA Barcodes:
Enhancing Traceability in Forest and Fishery Certification, 52 NAT. RESOURCES J. 421,
431 (2012).
41. Moore et al., supra note 30, at R119.
42. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 3 (“Prices range widely, even for the same type of
fish, but be suspicious if fish is supercheap. For what turned out to be real grouper steaks,
we paid $6.80 and $9.99 per pound. The ‘grouper steaks’ that were really pollock and
tilefish cost us just $4.99 and $5.60 per pound, respectively.”).
43. Dan Flynn, Oceana Study: ‘Fish Fraud’ Ripping Off American Consumers, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2013) (quoting Oceana’s follow up report to the initial
investigation).
44. Dustin Cranor & Amelia Vorpahl, Oceana Study Uncovering Widespread Seafood
Fraud Nationwide 33% of Seafood is Mislabeled in Grocery Stores, Restaurants, and
Sushi Venues (Feb. 21, 2013), http://oceana.org/en/news-media/press-center/pressreleases/oceana-study-uncovers-widespread-seafood-fraud-nationwide
(“While
44
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red snapper for the bland-tasting, farmed, less-expensive tilapia.45 In its
2012 follow-up study to the 2011 report exposing rampant fish fraud, the
Boston Globe visited, for example, “Symphony Sushi — selected by
Boston Magazine as one of the city’s best neighborhood restaurants in
2010 — [where] a $15.95 crispy red snapper meal turned out to be
tilapia.”46 Similarly, samples taken from the Boston Children’s hospital
determined that “the fish sandwich described by a cafeteria clerk as cod
tested as less-expensive pollock.”47 Also, “instead of ‘fresh Boston cod’
promised on the menu, Jerry Remy’s Seaport served Pacific cod, which
is often previously frozen, cheaper, and hauled thousands of miles to
New England.”48
Fish fraud is also bad for business. A study by the Grocery
Manufacturers Association found that the cost of food fraud to the food
industry alone is $10 to $15 billion per year.49 Seafood fraud damages
the domestic seafood industry when domestic fisheries are undersold by
foreign fisheries that gain an unfair economic advantage by mislabeling
in order to evade tarrifs and sell inferior products at inflated prices.50
2. Environmental Concerns
Second, seafood fraud can indirectly harm the environment because
misinformation affects a consumer’s choice, which may be based on
social or environmental concerns, undermining the consumer’s reasons
and future motivation for paying a higher price.51 For example, in the
case of the over-fished red snapper, substituting or mislabeling the
species makes it difficult for a consumer to recognize over-fishing when

percent of all the retail outlets visited sold mislabeled fish, sushi venues had the worst
level of mislabeling at 74 percent.”).
45. Goetz, supra note 10 (Other in-demand fish for which a different species is
commonly substituted like cod, grouper, halibut and Chilean seabass.).
46. Abelson 2012, supra note 23.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Ass’n Food, Beverage, and Consumer Products Companies, Consumer Product
Fraud:
Deterrence
and
Detection
3
(2010),
available
at
http://www.gmaonline.org/downloads/research-and-reports/consumerproductfraud.pdf.
50. See, e.g., Nicole Lou, Bait and Switch: the Fraud Crisis in the Seafood Industry,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/baitand-switch/388126/.
51. WARNER ET AL, supra note 10, at 26-27 (“With no effective accountability in the
seafood supply chain, fish obtained by illegal and unregulated means are finding an easy
and entry onto our dinner plates profitable.”).
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she sees the species as a readily-available item at restaurants.52 As
Oceana campaign director Beth Lowell said, “if people see something on
the menu all the time, they may have no idea it is disappearing from the
ocean.”53 This undermines systems put in place in order to promote
sustainable fisheries, like ecological labeling, that rely on proper species
identification to drive demand in such a way as to beneficially impact
fisheries and the environment.54 If the consumer were to discover the
deception, her faith in the brands may be disrupted.55 Another
environmental harm may arise with seafood fraud when fisheries
regulators rely on species labels on imported and domestic fish to set
catch limits and conserve fisheries. For example, “The Globe-sponsored
testing showed that yellow fin tuna wontons at the chain restaurant ‘Not
Your Average Joe’s’ in Westborough were filled with chunks of southern
blue fin tuna.”56 That’s a critically endangered species, according to the
International Union for Conservation of Nature, a worldwide
environmental network of governments, scientists, and nonprofits.”57
3. Food Safety Concerns
Third, food safety concerns are raised when food is adulterated.58
Seafood fraud is a significant threat to a safe food system. As stated by
FDA, “in the interest of public health, it is vital that both domesticallyprocessed and imported seafood is safe, wholesome, and properly labeled
. . . there are numerous potential health risks associated with misbranding
seafood species.”59 In the United States, fifteen percent of documented
foodborne illness is due to seafood contamination.60 Misidentification or
adulteration can lead to foodborne illness because certain species have
specific care requirements that, when not followed, may cause foodborne

52. Abelson 2011, supra note 21.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Moore et al., supra note 30, at R119 (“in essence, the safety of the whole food
supply chain collapse into a singular factor, the criminal. Only he or she has enough
information to know the extent of the hazard introduced into the food supply chain.”).
59. DNA-based
Seafood
Identification,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/DNASeafoodIdentification/default.htm
(last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
60. Ching-Fu Lin, Global Food Safety: Exploring Key Elements for an International
Regulatory System, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 637, 639 (2011).
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illness for certain people.61 Further, many species substitutes contain
higher levels of mercury, an element that should be generally avoided in
high quantities or by individuals more sensitive to its negative effects
because of pregnancy, age, etc.62 For example, NOAA found that some
of the falsely-labeled grouper was in fact tilefish, a species that contains
three times the amount of mercury. Worth mentioning again, and even
more severe, is when tuna is substituted by escolar, also known as snake
mackerel.63 Although similar in appearance, escolar is not in the same
family as tuna, sells for 20% less, and the FDA advises against its
consumption because the fish contains an oil known to cause severe
gastrointestinal problems.64 In 2007, fish fraud made the news when
imported puffer fish, containing a deadly toxin, was mislabeled as
monkfish and many consumers became severely ill.65
More health hazards may arise when the country of origin is
misidentified. Many people are allergic to certain species of fish because,
for example, fish from a hazardous area may then be unknowingly sold
or consumed.66

61. Goetz, supra note 10 (found a histamine-containing fish, catfish, substituted for
grouper, a species that looks similar but does not require the same post-harvest treatments
to avoid histamine; high histamine levels can cause illness).
62. In a 2008 study by the New York Times, writers tested over 20 stores selling sushi
in Manhattan and found that a “regular diet of six pieces of sushi a week would exceed
the levels [of mercury] considered acceptable by the Environmental Protection Agency.”
Marian Burros, High Mercury Levels Are Found in Tuna Sushi, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/23/dining/23sushi.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. A
further alarming fact in the study was that owners of the sushi stores did not know that
the fish posed a risk to consumers. Id.; WARNER ET AL., supra note 6..
63. Jacob H. Lowenstein, George Amato & Sergios-Orestis Kolokotronis, The Real
Maccoyii: Identifying Tuna Sushi with DNA Barcodes – Contrasting Characteristic
Attributes and Genetic Distances, 4 PLOS ONE 11 (2009), available at
http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjour
nal.pone.0007866&representation=PDF.
64. Beth Daley & Jenn Abelson, From Sea to Sushi Bar, a System Open to Abuse,
BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 24, 2011) (in response, the distributer claimed that there is no
difference between the fish, stating “[w]hite tuna and escolar are the same species,’’ he
said, “[w]e use both names.”).
65. FDA, FDA NEWS RELEASE, FDA WARNING ON MISLABELED MONKFISH: FISH
BELIEVED TO BE PUFFER FISH; CONTAINS DEADLY TOXIN (May 24, 2007),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2007/ucm108920.htm.
66. Goetz, supra note 10, at 3 (discussed as an example fish sold with an inaccurate
label could have been fished in an area flagged for Ciguatera, a toxin found in some
tropical reef fish, or Vibrio, formed in shell fish when waters are too warm); WARNER ET
AL., supra note 6.
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Another food safety threat from seafood fraud is that at least half of
the imported seafood is from aquaculture production.67 Although
aquaculture is safe in many cases, the potential danger here is that
seafood grown in confined aquaculture areas can have high rates of
bacterial infections, so growers may treat them with antibiotic and
antifungal drug agents in order to increase their survival rates.68 The
residue from these drugs can remain in the fish after harvesting and
processing, which then means it can be consumed.69 These drugs “have
been linked to cancer, severe allergic reactions, and increased antibiotic
resistance.”70 As aquaculture imports continue to increase, so does this
potential risk.71
Despite this evidence, seafood fraud is not often considered a food
safety issue. A mere skimming of the titles of news reports included in
this comment reveals that the emphasis is often placed on the economic
impact to the consumer or the market. As this article will discuss, the
FDA, despite having the authority to inspect imported fish to protect
against seafood fraud, places very few resources on detecting food fraud
because, one could argue, the FDA does not view this as a serious
enough food safety concern to devote sufficient resources.72 Therefore,
this comment concludes that greater emphasis on the legitimate food
safety implications of seafood fraud may be the most effective strategy to
focusing the existing regulatory regime and resources on addressing
seafood fraud.
While it is evident seafood fraud is happening, it is less certain at
which point in the chain from “hook to fork” this is occurring.73 For
example, Oceana conceded that “because [their] study was restricted to
seafood sold in retail outlets, [they] cannot say exactly where the
67. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-286, SEAFOOD SAFETY: FDA
NEEDS TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF IMPORTED SEAFOOD AND BETTER LEVERAGE LIMITED
RESOURCES, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter GAO Report 11-286].
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. GAO Report-09-258, supra note 32, at 7.
73. The phrase “hook to fork” is commonly used in food and fishing literature and
generally refers to the adaption of the terrestrial local food culinary movement to seafood.
Harry Hurt III, Dinner, From Hook to Fork, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/20/business/20pursuits.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. It
can also refer to a risk-based approach to food safety that traces the different stages of the
food chain system and examines the practices and procedures. European Food
Information Council, Farm to Fork (Jun. 2006), http://www.eufic.org/article/en/foodsafety-quality/farm-to-fork/expid/review-farm-to-fork/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).
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fraudulent activity occurred.”74 Part of this difficulty stems from the fact
that many hands will touch the seafood along this chain, making nearly
impossible with current laws and technology to determine where exactly
the fraud occurred. 75 After harvesters catch the seafood, they ice or flashfreeze, and it is then sometimes transferred at sea to larger vessels, where
it may be mixed with other species.76 At this point, the seafood may then
be processed at sea, which includes removing the heads and guts in order
to delay spoilage, making identification all the more difficult.77
“Unscrupulous people may try to falsify documentation or hide illegally
caught fish with legally captured ones, resulting in mislabeled fish
ending up at supermarkets and restaurants.”78
II. THE CURRENT FOOD SAFETY REGULATORY REGIME’S REGULATION
OF SEAFOOD FRAUD
The difficulty in detecting and addressing seafood fraud is
compounded by the inadequacy of the current federal regime regulating
the safety of seafood. This comment focuses on the federal level; any
discussion of reform logically should begin at the point where the
majority of seafood enters the U.S. market. Attempts to address seafood
fraud at the local and state level have been largely unsuccessful.79 That
said, several proposals exist to address seafood fraud at the local, state,
international, and private sector levels, which could be complementary to
federal regulatory reform.80
The current federal food safety regime is an inter-tangled web of
conflicting agency objectives and redundancy; commentators often
criticize the U.S. food safety system for having both a lack of
coordination and a lack of adequate funding.81 The often-repeated
74. WARNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 2.
75. Friedman, supra note 3.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Abelson 2011, supra note 21.
80. See generally Recommendations of the Presidential Task Force on Combating
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud, 79 Fed. Reg. 75537
(proposed Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Recommendations of the Presidential Task Force]
(submitting for public comment recommendations for implementing strategies for
addressing seafood fraud that include local, state, federal, and international proposals);
Ching-Fu Lin, supra note 60 (identifies the essential elements of successful global
regulation of food safety).
81. See, e.g., Nathan M. Texler, “Market” Regulation: Confronting Industrial
Agriculture’s Food Safety Failures, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 311, 323 (“As aforementioned,
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example of the food safety regulation of the all-too-familiar-to-lawstudents pizza illustrates the situation:
The FDA regulates frozen pizza, but the USDA takes over if it is
topped with two percent or more of meat or poultry. Therefore,
inspections at these facilities follow two different sets of
guidelines issued by the FDA and the USDA. Therein lies the
rub: the USDA inspects facilities that make pepperoni on a daily
basis and then inspects the plants that produce
pepperoni pizza every day, whereas the FDA will inspect
cheese pizza facilities once every ten years. The difference is
astounding,
especially
considering
certain
froze
pepperoni pizza products – despite receiving more inspections
than given to cheese pizza – were recalled in 2007 due to
possible E. coli O157:H7 contamination.82
The regulation of seafood fraud is no exception; there is no single
agency regulating seafood fraud on the federal level, the agencies that do
regulate it do not often cooperate, and funding is scare.83 This section
examines the historical background of the food safety regime in order to
give context to its regulation of seafood fraud. It then reviews each
agency’s role in addressing seafood fraud, identifies its active and latent
regulatory authority, and analyzes its respective shortcomings and
common criticism in regards to addressing seafood fraud.
A. Historical Background of the Modern Food Safety Regulatory Regime
This article does not attempt to provide a historical analysis of the
food safety regime, a topic thoroughly covered in food and drug law
literature.84 Nonetheless, a brief summary of how the modern food safety
regulatory regime in the United States came about is necessary to place
the current regulation of seafood sale and distribution, and the fraud
thereof, in context.
The United States’ first attempt to address the growth of adulteration
and food safety issues in general was the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act,
an omnibus act passed largely in reaction to a string of expository
journalism of the widely-read finding of Upton Sinclair in his expository
the federal food safety bureaucracy is a maze of responsibility, which understandably
makes it difficult for agencies to communicate and proceed along one common path.”).
82. Id.
83. See GAO Report-09-258, supra note 32.
84. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 29.
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piece, The Jungle.85 This was followed in 1930 with the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA), largely creating FDA in its modern form.86 This
pattern of separate, reactionary laws eventually led Congress to create a
“bifurcated system that foreshadow[s] the current confusion.”87 One
scholar in this area explains that this chasm between food and food safety
grew even greater when FDA was consolidated within the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS).88 As it stands now, “currently four
agencies stand at the center of the morass: (1) the
USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS); (2) the FDA’s
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CSFAN); (3) the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Office of Prevention,
Pesticides, and Toxic Substances; and (4) the Centers for Disease
Control’s (CDC) Food Safety Office.”89 “No single agency or voice has
the ultimate responsibility or authority to make the decisions necessary to
assure the American public that what we eat will not make us sick.”90
B. Current federal regime for seafood safety
Three federal agencies play key roles in detecting and preventing
seafood fraud: the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), the Department of Commerce’s National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), and the FDA.91 Additionally, minor
roles in regulating fish fraud are held by NOAA’s Office of Law
Enforcement, the USDA, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).92
Again, outside the scope of this article, but critical to full understanding
of the overall regulation of fisheries, is the role of state, local, and
international regulatory bodies. 93
85. Texler, supra note 81, at 317.
86. See U.S. FDA., WHAT WE DO: HISTORY (2010), available at
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/default.htm (explaining that the
FDA traces its history to 1848, making it arguably the oldest comprehensive consumer
protection agency in the US federal government).
87. Texler, supra note 81, at 317.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. GAO Report-09-258, supra note 32, at 2.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Brandt T. Bowman, Roll Sushi, Roll: Defining “Sushi Grade” for the
Consumer and the Sushi Bar, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 495, 509 (2011) (discussing the role
of the Food Code at the local and state levels, writing that “FDA created the Code as a
model to assist state and local governments in initiating and maintaining effective
programs for the prevention of food borne illnesses.”); BETH DALEY & JEAN ABELSON,
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1. UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
Considering the predominance of imported over domestic seafood in
the United States, CBP has a significant role in the regulation of
imported seafood safety and the adulteration of imported seafood and
seafood products.94 Broadly speaking, CBP collects import duties and
tariffs, assesses money damages for the failure to redeliver imported
products, and oversees the exportation or destruction of refused
products.95 In terms of seafood, “CBP reviews seafood import
documentation to detect schemes to avoid paying the appropriate custom
duties as seafood products enter the country, among other things.”96
Besides inspection, CBP operates a national statistical sampling program,
known as the Compliance Measurement Program, “which randomly
selects shipments of imports by commodity for review or examination to
determine the degree to which they comply with trade laws and
regulations.”97 Finally, CBP can assess penalties against a violating
importer, which can range from two to four times the loss of lawful
duties and fees.98
CBP is, however, limited in its resources. For example, in 2008 CBP
officials examined between approximately 1 to 2.4 percent of all seafood
imports.99 Similarly, the Compliance Measurement Program in 2008
examined only 766 seafood products out of nearly 400,000 imported.100
Also, the fees are limited to enforcing violations of anti-dumping and
tariff evasions, which are a limited fraction of the overall seafood fraud
problem.101
The overlap in authority between FDA and CBP on imported foods
has been largely seen as positive. Although technically, because of this
overlap, an import found to be in violation by FDA could still be reexported for sale by CBP, in practice CBP complies with requests by the
ALI CLE COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS, ST036 ALI-ABA 103 (2012) (“Several states have taken matters into their own
hands. Florida officials regularly inspect menus and compare them with invoices and
boxes of fish in the restaurants. Proprietors found with misrepresented fish face fines of
up to $800 and can have their restaurant license suspended or revoked.”).
94. ARTHUR N. LEVINE, FDA ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, ¶ 910 STATUTORY AUTHORITY
OVER IMPORTS, 2004 WL 5032328.
95. Id.
96. GAO Report-09-258, supra note 32, at 2.
97. Id. at 6.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 8.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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FDA for seizure.102 Further, FDA has worked with CBP to support a
seizure under laws that give the authority to CBP, even though false
entry declaration is also within the purview of the FDA.103 In short,
“[t]he laws establishing FDA and Customs authority over imports give
the two agencies flexibility in seizing violative imports.”104
2. National Marine Fisheries Service
NMFS has the ability to regulate seafood fraud through its voluntary
fee-for-service inspection program, which inspects seafood purchases
made by retailers, processors, distributors, and other firms in order to
verify their net weight, ensuring that the species is identified correctly
and not adulterated.105 This inspection addresses “economic integrity
issues, such as the accuracy of a seafood product’s label, as well as
seafood safety issues.”106 NMFS’s Quality Management Program enables
the organization to apply Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points
(HAACP) principles to food safety and economic fraud risks, helping
identify measures that can prevent seafood fraud.107
Overall, NMFS officials interviewed by GAO reported that they
inspect approximately one-third of seafood consumed in the United
States.108 NMFS officials reported that they had used these two functions
to identify instances of seafood fraud, especially short-weighting, in both
domestic and international facilities.109 NMFS reported finding species
substitution through visual inspection and testing in NOAA’s National
Seafood Inspection Laboratory.110 However, a GAO report in 2009 found
that NMFS does not keep a comprehensive record of these inspections.111
Further, FDA admitted it does not rely on these inspections.112

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Levine, supra note 94.
Id.
Id.
GAO Report-09-258, supra note 32, at 4-5.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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3. Food and Drug Administration
While FDA’s legal authority comes from the FDCA and other laws
briefly highlighted above, the FDA’s structure is a creation of
administrative order and could, therefore, “be extinguished by the stroke
of a pen.”113 Broadly speaking, in terms of addressing food fraud, 21
U.S.C. § 371(a) sets out the general authority to the HHS to promulgate
regulations for efficient enforcement of the FDCA.114 Section 331
specifically prohibits the act or cause thereof of adulterated or
misbranded food.115 Section 343 provides that food is “misbranded”
when it is “false or misleading in any particular way,” it is “offered for
sale under another name,” it has a “false or misleading label,” or is an
“imitation of another food.” 116 Further, section 342 provides that a food
shall be deemed to be “adulterated” if it “contains any poisonous or
deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health . . . if the
quantity of such substance in such food does not ordinarily render it
injurious to health.”117 Although the latter has not been used to address
common types of fish fraud, courts have interpreted this broadly,118
providing a potential source of authority for FDA to regulate fish fraud.
Next, FDA derives its authority to regulate imports from 21 U.S.C. §
381, which prescribes that a food may be refused entry into the United
States if it appears to be manufactured, processed, or packed under
unsanitary conditions or if it is adulterated or misbranded.119 The 2002
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
(known as the Bioterrorism Act) significantly expanded the authority of
FDA to potentially regulate the food system to prevent and address fish
fraud. 120 The Act dictates that food processors and handlers must be able
to “identify the immediate previous sources and the immediate
subsequent recipients of food.”121 The Act exempts restaurants and
farms (including fish farms) from these requirements.122 Thus, “[w]hile
113. RICHARD A. MERRILL & PETER BARTON HUTT, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 20 (Foundation Press ed., 3d ed. 2007).
114. 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2012).
115. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2012).
116. 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012).
117. 21 U.S.C. § 342 (2012).
118. See U.S. v. 88 Cases, More or Less, Containing Bireley’s Orange Bev., 187 F.2d
967 (3d Cir. 1951).
119. 21 U.S.C. § 381 (2012).
120. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 350c (2012)).
121. 21 U.S.C. § 350c (2012).
122. Id. § 350c(a)(1).
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this means seafood handlers must have a record of where they got a
shipment of seafood and where they sent it, it does not affect the labeling
that accompanies the food.”123
The FDA has three responsibilities in the regulation of seafood: first,
the FDA maintains a list of seafood names that is intended to help the
industry correctly label products; second, it offers guidance to help
seafood producers comply; third, FDA administers a HACCP program
that requires seafood producers to identify and develop a process to
mitigate biological, chemical, and physical hazards that are likely to
occur.124
First, the FDA maintains a list of seafood names that is intended to
help industry correctly label products and ensure FDA inspectors identify
mislabeled products. The “Seafood List” compiles the scientific and
market names for imported and domestic seafood in order to promote
uniformity in the use of FDA-acceptable market names by the
industry.125 In theory, this could be an adept tool at preventing species
substitution, but the GAO found this list had not been updated
substantially or made readily available to the public.126 Similarly, FDA
also maintains an “import alert” list to detain “entries of imported foods
that appear to have significant recurring violations.”127 However, the
GAO found in 2009 that the FDA only physically examined a small
amount, and, thus, the list is underutilized.128
Second, the primary form of guidance offered by the FDA for
seafood producers, as well as state and local governments seeking to
create effective programs for seafood safety, is the Food Code.129
Although the Food Code is not any form of legal authority,130 it is
commonly regarded as the FDA’s best advice for creating “a uniform
system of provisions that address the safety and protection of food
offered at retail and in food service.”131 The Food Code does so by
123. Goetz, supra note 10.
124. GAO Report-09-258, supra note 32, at 10.
125. Id. at 5.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 18.
128. Id. at 19.
129. FDA, FOOD CODE: 2013 RECOMMENDATION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
(2013)
[hereinafter
FOOD
CODE],
available
at,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/RetailFoodProtection/FoodCo
de/UCM374510.pdf.
130. Id. at i.
131. Food
Code
2013,
U.S.
FOOD
AND
DRUG
ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/RetailFoodProtection/FoodCode/ucm3742
75.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
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providing “a model to develop or update their own food safety rules and
to be consistent with national food regulatory policy.”132 Certain
provisions are directly applicable to seafood. For example, Section 3402.11 “Parasite Destruction” recommends a freezing process for raw
fish.133 However, the Food Code then subsequently exempts the freezing
requirement from shellfish, shucked scallops, several tuna species, any
aquaculture fish, and processed fish eggs.134
Further, commentators point out other problems with the
effectiveness of the Food Code, beyond its exemptions. First, state
legislatures have not adopted or implemented the Food Code
uniformly.135 Second, specifically in regards to sushi, the regulations do
not require enough information be provided to consumers to allow
consumers to make educated decisions.136 This further underscores the
need of a uniform or cooperative federal regulatory effort to address
seafood fraud.
Third, FDA’s HACCP program requires seafood producers to
identify and develop process to mitigate biological, chemical, and
physical hazards that are likely to occur.137 Every processor is required
either to conduct or have conducted a hazard analysis identifying likely
safety hazards and establishing preventative measures that the processor
can apply.138 The regulations further provide that every processor shall
have and implement a written HACCP plan whenever a hazard analysis
reveals one or more food safety hazards that are reasonably likely to
occur.139 The HACCP must be specific to each processing location and
each type or group of types of fish.140
The HACCP plan can be understood in two steps.141 The first step
under the plan is for the processor to identify and list food safety hazards
that are likely to occur.142 Second, the processor is to list the “critical
control points” for each of the hazards identified include those “designed
to control food safety hazards introduced inside or outside of the
132. Food
Code,
U.S.
FOOD
AND
DRUG
ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/RetailFoodProtection/FoodCode/default.h
tm (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
133. FOOD CODE, supra note 129, at § 3-402.11.
134. Id.§ 3-402.11(B).
135. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 93, at 511.
136. Id. at 512.
137. 21 C.F.R. § 120 et seq. (2012).
138. Id. § 123.6(a) (2012).
139. Id. § 123.6.
140. Id.
141. Bowman, supra note 93, at 507 (describing the program as two steps).
142. Id.; 21 C.F.R. §§ 123.6(b)-(c).
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processing plant environment, which may include hazards that occur
before, during, [or] after harvest.”143 In all, the HACCP plan must
include a list of critical limits,144 monitoring procedures, corrective action
plans, verification, and other miscellaneous administrative
requirements.145 The processor is supposed to take the corrective action
noted within the HACCP plan if they deviate from the plan.146 A failure
to comply with this renders the product adulterated under section
402(a)(4).147
While some commenters proclaim the HACCP to be the best food
safety system available,148 others identify clear shortcomings in the
HACCP program.149 First, there are several issues of validation.150
Further, there are specific shortcomings of the HACCP plan in
addressing seafood fraud: under the HACCP program, FDA inspects
domestic firms involved in the production, storage, and distribution of
seafood to ensure that their HACCP plans are properly designed and
being implemented.151 However, GAO found in 2009 that FDA agents
spend “very little time” looking for seafood fraud.152 Specifically, only
.5 percent of FDA inspections included searching for indicators of
seafood fraud between 2003 and 2008.153 In regards to foreign importer
inspections under the HACCP program, the GAO investigation in 2009
found that FDA was inspecting only 61 out of 14,569 registered foreign
seafood firms for indicators of seafood fraud.154 The GAO report found
two potential reasons for this, aside from limited resources and a

143. Id. § 342(a)(4); Bowman, supra note 93, at 507.
144. “Critical limit means the maximum or minimum value to which a physical,
biological, or chemical parameter must be controlled at a critical control point to prevent,
eliminate, or reduce to an acceptable level the occurrence of the identified food safety
hazard.” 21 C.F.R. § 123.3(c).
145. Bowman, supra note 93, at 507; 21 C.F.R. §§ 123.6(c)(3)-(7).
146. Id. § 123.7.
147. Id. § 123.6(g).
148. William H. Spurbur & Richard F. Stier, Happy 50th Birthday HACCP:
Retrospective and Prospective, FOODSAFETY MAG. (Dec. 2009), available at http://www
.foodsafetymagazine.com/magazine-archive1/december-2009january-2010/happy-50thbirthday-to-haccp-retrospective-and-prospective/.
149. Bowman, supra note 93, at 508.
150. Id. (discusses how validation issues arise when processors fail to follow plan and
when a poor initial hazard analysis fails to establish adequate controls for the risks
because the risks have not been properly identified).
151. 21 C.F.R. §§ 123.6(b)-(c).
152. GAO Report 09-258, supra note 32, at 19.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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perception that this is not a food safety issue.155 The first is that FDA
does not cooperate sufficiently with NMFS inspectors.156 Second, FDA’s
HACCP regulations do not include measures to identify and mitigate
economic fraud risks.157
Overall, even with these major tools for addressing seafood fraud,
FDA is not adequately addressing seafood fraud. More specifically, less
than 2% of fish imported to the US, within the jurisdiction of FDA, is
inspected; although it may be detected incidentally, of that 2 %, only
.05% is inspected specifically for seafood fraud.158 The one exception has
been the progress FDA has made against certain importers who regularly
adulterate food.159 Further, funding is limited. Gavin Gibbons, of the
National Fisheries Institute, says that FDA has the authority to deal with
species substitution and other types of fraud “but they basically don’t use
it, saying essentially that that’s an unfunded mandate.”160 Due to the
mismanagement of the Seafood List, and the limitations and voluntary
nature of the guidance to industry and states, and the inadequacy of the
HACCP program, consumers have little assurance that the seafood they
purchase is correctly labeled, which presents an economic,
environmental, and food safety problem.161

155. Id. at 13 (“ FDA directs its field staff to minimize work on economic fraud issues
because it considers food safety a higher priority than economic fraud. Nonetheless,
FDA’s health and safety actions, such as examinations of seafood imports, sometimes
uncover seafood fraud incidentally.”).
156. Id. at 25 (“In addition, these key agencies have not established policies and
procedures to promote effective collaboration and better leverage resources to achieve
their common goal. As a result, the agencies have not taken advantage of opportunities to
share information that could benefit each agency’s efforts to detect and prevent seafood
fraud, nor have they identified similar and sometimes overlapping activities that could be
better coordinated to use limited resources more efficiently and effectively.”).
157. Id. at 20.
158. Id. at 19.
159. Lyndsey Layton, FDA Pressured to Combat Rising “Food Fraud”, WASH. POST,
Mar 30, 2010, at A01 (Peter Xuong Lam, president of Virginia Star Seafood Corporation
of Fairfax, was convicted last year of selling the mislabeled catfish. Ten other individuals
and companies were also charged. Lam was sentenced to five years in prison and is
barred from importing food into the United States for the next 20 years.).
160. Friedman, supra note 3.
161. GAO Report-09-258, supra note 32, at What GAO Found.
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4. United States Department of Agriculture
USDA regulates country of origin labeling for seafood products.162
More specifically, much of the regulations focus on the distinction
between farmed and wild-caught labels.163 However, commentators claim
USDA did not create a strong labeling program in implementing this
law: “[p]rocessed seafood is exempt, leaving more than 50% sold in the
U.S. without labels; 90% of fish sellers, such as wholesale markets, are
exempt; and no enforcement mechanism exists and violators face paltry
fines.”164 Further, this does not seem to address mislabeling; for example,
a 2005 study revealed that “wild-caught” salmon at six of eight New
York City stores was actually farm-raised.165 Although obviously limited
in scope, USDA also oversees the food safety of farm catfish.166
5. Federal Trade Commission
FTC is responsible for regulating whether seafood is being truthfully
advertised, and has authority to regulate the context of seafood labeling,
marketing, and advertising.167 Specifically, FDA and FTC share authority
over the misbranding of fish.168 FTC derives this power from section 5
of the FTC Act.169 FTC cannot seek civil penalties, but it may issue cease
and desist orders.170 Similar to FDA’s guidance, FTC issues Green
Guides that provide interpretive guidance on what might be considered
162. Passed into law as part of the 2002 Farm Bill, the Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002, the Country of Origin Labeling (COOL Act) requires retailers to
provide county-of-origin labeling for fresh beef, and some seafood; Distribution and
Marketing of Agricultural Products, 7 U.S.C. § 1638a (2012).
163. 7 C.F.R. § 60.300 (2006).
164. Seafood Labels, FOOD AND WATER WATCH, https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org
/common-resources/fish/seafood/labeling/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
165. Id.
166. 21 U.S.C. § 601 (2006); GAO Report 11-286, supra note 67, at 11.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006); see generally Jason J. Czarnezki, Andrew Homan &
Meghan Jeans, Self-Declared Seafood Eco-Labels (Apr. 7, 2014) (unpublished article)
(on
file
with
Pace
Law
School),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id=2421530 (discussing the role of FTC
in seafood labeling).
168. GAO Report-09-258, supra note 33, at 10; Czarnezki et al., supra note 167, at 3.
169. Czarnezki et al., supra note 167, at 3; Letter from Representatives Edward
Markey and Barney Frank to Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission (Oct.
31,
2011),
http://www.savingseafood.org/imagines/documents/Washington/frank/markey/letter/on/s
eafood/labeling-1.pdf.
170. Czarnezki et al., supra note 167, at 4.
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mislabeling under the FTC Act.171 However, “while the [Green Guides]
provide important interpretive guidance for what may or may not be
considered deceptive or misleading and receive deference from the
courts, they are non-binding and occupy a deferred-to middle space
between legally mandatory eco-labeling requirements and truly voluntary
standards.”172 Nonetheless, cooperation between FDA and FTC in this
area is encouraging and has led to successful detection and persecution
of seafood fraud in some instances.173
6. Collaboration Between Agencies is Limited
Overall, aside from the specific issues addressed above with regard
to each agency’s efforts, a common theme in the criticism by the GAO
and other commentators is a lack of cooperation among the CBP, NMFS,
and FDA to detect and prevent seafood fraud. Specifically, the GAO
2009 report cited a lack of common goals in detecting and preventing
fraud, and the agencies often gave similar or overlapping activities that
“could be better coordinated to use limited resources more efficiently and
effectively.”174
This lack of collaboration leads to a lack of information sharing
between agencies that could help each better detect and prevent seafood
fraud.175 The 2009 GAO report found that:
CBP collects information on seafood imports, such as product
type, product quantity, and country of origin, through the review
and examination of imported goods . . . . NMFS collects
information in lot inspection reports that identify short-weighted
domestic and imported products. FDA collects information on
imported seafood products, such as the accuracy of product
labeling, though entry document reviews, food label reviews,
product examinations, inspections, and laboratory analysis. . . .
However, these agencies have not developed procedures to
identify or share useful information.176

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 2-8.
Id. at 12.
Id.
GAO Report-09-258, supra note 32, at 25.
Id.
Id. at 26.
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By developing procedures for sharing information on importers and
products, the GAO report concluded the agencies could increase
inspections without additional resources.177
Further, the report found inefficient overlaps.178 This was sometimes
because the agencies were “not sure whether [they] can rely on NMFC
inspections, in part due concerns about potential conflicts of interest.”
This lack of collaboration occurred despite numerous memoranda of
understandings between the agencies.179
III. FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT’S (FSMA) IMPACT ON THE
REGULATION OF SEAFOOD FRAUD
FSMA180 is perhaps the most significant legislative change to US
food regulation since the introduction of the FDCA. In light of a series of
well-publicized food illness outbreaks,181 as well as continuous criticism
of the fragmented nature of food safety regulation in the US,182 Congress
passed FSMA to significantly enhance the jurisdiction of FDA and close
several notable gaps in the U.S. food safety system.183
Broadly speaking, the following are the key provisions that expanded
the power of the FDA: first, FSMA gives FDA the ability to mandate
food safety measures at the farm level for fruit and vegetable
production184; second, FSMA authorizes FDA to create HAACPs for all
177. Id. at 32.
178. Id. at 28.
179. Id. at 28.
180. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 142 Stat. 3885 (2011)
[hereinafter FSMA].
181. See, e.g., Mary Clare Jalonick, Egg Recall Expands to More Than Half a Billion
21,
2010),
http://www.huffington
Nationwide,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct.
.com/2010/08/21/egg-recall-expands-to-mor_n_690019.html; Michael Moss & Andrew
Martin, Food Problems Elude Private Inspectors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/business/06food.html?_r=2&hp& (explaining how
private inspectors inspecting with authority from the FDA “were too late to prevent what
has become one of the nation’s worst known outbreaks of food-borne disease in recent
years, in which nine are believed to have died and an estimated 22,500 were sickened”).
182. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-212, FOOD SAFETY: EXPERIENCES
OF SEVEN COUNTRIES IN CONSOLIDATING THEIR FOOD SAFETY SYSTEMS 24-25 (2005);
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-794, FOOD SAFETY: SELECTED
COUNTRIES’ SYSTEMS CAN OFFER INSIGHTS INTO ENSURING IMPORT SAFETY AND
RESPONDING TO FOODBORNE ILLNESS 2 (2008).
183. Jalonick, supra note 181.
184. A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, United States Food Law Update: The
FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Obesity and Deceptive Labeling Enforcement, 7 J.
FOOD L. & POL’Y 135, 137 (2011); 21 U.S.C. 350h (2012).
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food processing facilities185; and third, FSMA directs the secretary of
HHS to “coordinate with the food industry to develop pilot programs to
explore methods to more rapidly and effectively identify foodborne
illness outbreaks.”186 Finally, FSMA expands the authority and power of
FDA to regulate how food is introduced into interstate commerce.187
Relevant to seafood fraud, FSMA provides FDA new authority to
regulate imports and to oversee foreign import inspections. For the first
time, importers must verify that their foreign suppliers have adequate
preventive controls in place to ensure safety, and FDA will be able to
accredit qualified third party auditors to certify that foreign food facilities
are complying with U.S. food safety standards. 188 FSMA required of
FDA several actions within certain timeframes that relate to seafood
safety. For example, FSMA required that, within one year, FDA release
a guidance document on mitigation strategies for protection against
intentional adulteration.189 It also required FDA to designate high-risk
foods for which additional recordkeeping would be “appropriate and
necessary to protect public health,” and make this list available to the
public.190 FSMA further mandated FDA update its Fish and Fished
Products HACCP Guidance within 180 days.191 However, FDA only met
the last of these three requirements within the established timelines.192
Two FSMA provisions may have some chance of addressing seafood
fraud more adequately than the current approach. First, the Foreign
Supplier Verification Program that, as proposed, would require importers
185. Current Good Manufacturing Practice and Hazard Analysis and Risk-Based
Preventive Controls for Human Food, 78 Fed. Reg. 3646, 3805-08 (Subpart C) (proposed
Jan.16, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 117), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-01-16/pdf/2013-00125.pdf.
186. Endres & Johnson, supra note 184, at 138; 21 U.S.C. § 204, 124 .
187. Endres & Johnson, supra note 184 (explaining that “within the context of a food
safety investigation, the FDA now has mandatory recall authority based on a ‘reasonable
probability’ that a food is adulterated or misbranded and the exposure or use ‘will cause
serious adverse health consequences” to humans or animals’”); 21 USC § 423.
188. Frequently
Asked
Questions
for
FMSA,
FDA.GOV,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm247559.htm (last accessed
Feb. 1, 2014).
189. 21 U.S.C. § 350i (2011).
190. 21 U.S.C. § 2223 (2011).
191. FSMA § 103(h), Pub. L. No. 111-353, 142 Stat. 3885 (2011).
192. Guidance for Industry on Fish and Fishery Products Hazards and Controls, Fourth
Edition; Availability, 76 Fed. Reg. 23823-01 (Apr. 28, 2011) (providing “current
information relating to: (1) Potential hazards associated with the known commercial
species of vertebrate and invertebrate seafood, (2) potential hazards associated with
certain processing operations, (3) HACCP strategies that may be used to control the
potential hazards, and (4) other information related to food safety.”).
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subject to the rule perform certain risk-based activities to verify that food
imported has been produced in a manner that provides the same level of
public health protection as that required of domestic food producers.193
This proposed rule will have little actual effect on addressing seafood
fraud because FSMA exempts a facility already required to comply with,
and is indeed complying with, FDA’s Seafood HACCP Program.194
Second, as mentioned above, FSMA requires FDA designate highrisk foods that would subject certain importers of seafood to higher
recordkeeping requirements.195 Further, FSMA specifically requires FDA
to direct inspection resources towards facilities that import high
identified as high risk.196 As of 2014, FDA was still working to
implement this provision, and seafood had yet to receive such
designation.197 Even if FDA does designate seafood, the practicable
effect again seems limited given existing recordkeeping requirements.198
More broadly, FSMA has not been viewed in all that favorable of a
light, with many unsatisfied food safety advocates claiming it is
inadequate to address the problems plaguing the U.S. food system.199
While it does fill some jurisdictional gaps and provide previously lacking
mandatory recall authority, further calls for reform, particularly with
seafood, are likely.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The fragmented approach to regulation has led to a lack of
cooperation and insufficient inspections of imported seafood, which
constitutes the majority of seafood consumed in the US.200 Although
FDA is the agency with the most significant authority and ability to
193. Foreign Supplier Verification Programs for Importers of Food for Humans and
Animals, 79 Fed. Reg. 58574-01, (summary) (proposed Sept. 29, 2014) (to be codified 21
CFR pt. 1), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-09-29/pdf/201422448.pdf.
194. 21 U.S.C. § 350g(j) (2011) (providing an exemption for HACCP).
195. 21 U.S.C. § 2223 (2011).
196. 21 U.S.C. § 384c(a)(2) (2011).
197. See Designation of High-Risk Foods for Tracing; Request for Comments and for
Scientific Data and Information, 79 Fed. Reg. 6596-01, (Section I, part A) (proposed Feb.
4, 2014), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-02-04/pdf/2014-02255.pdf
(requesting public comment on draft approach to identifying high-risk food).
198. See supra Part II.B.3.
199. See e.g., Nicholas Obolensky, Note, The Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011:
Too Little, Too Broad, Too Bad, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 887 (2012) (analyzing
common criticisms of FSMA).
200. NMFS, supra note 1, at 1.
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regulate seafood, FDA does not appear to perceive that this is a
significant issue and, perhaps consequently, devotes few resources into
investigating seafood fraud.201 Even national calls for funding FSMA
mostly emphasize produce-related food illness.202 The SAFE Seafood
Act, proposed by Rep. Ed Markey, offers several proposals that could
address some of the problems raised in this comment. More recently, the
Presidential Task Force on Combating Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud released for comment several
proposed strategies for addressing seafood fraud and related issues. This
section lastly explores how increasing the emphasis on food safety could
build support for such action.
A. SAFE Seafood Act
Shortly following the Boston Globe investigation into seafood fraud
in the greater Boston area, Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA) sent letters to the
FDA, NOAA, and the FTC, inquiring about their oversight of seafood
fraud.203 From the response from the agencies, Markey concluded that the
“FDA has the lead responsibility for seafood safety and seafood labeling
at the Federal level, but NOAA also has significant expertise and
resources that could be utilized to address safety concerns.”204 Further,
the responses indicated that the FRC is responsible for regulating
whether seafood is being truthfully advertised.205 To Markey, “the
responses to these letters indicated that the agencies could more
effectively work together to combat the issue of seafood fraud.”206
In response to these shortcomings, then representative, now senator,
Edward Markey, D-MA, introduced 113 H.R. 1012, Safety and Fraud
Enforcement for Seafood Act, a bill to strengthen federal consumer
protection and product traceability with respect to commerciallymarketed seafood, and for other purposes, on March 6, 2013.207
201. See supra Part II.
202. See FDA, PRESIDENT’S FY 2016 BUDGET REQUEST: KEY INVESTMENTS FOR
IMPLEMENTING THE FDA FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT (FSMA) (Feb. 2, 2015),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/UCM432580.pdf
(mentioning produce safety seven times compared to one mention of seafood).
203. H.R. 6200, the Safety And Fraud Enforcement for Seafood Act (Summary),
http://democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/sites/democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/f
iles/documents/SAFE_Seafood_Summary.pdf.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Safety And Fraud Enforcement for Seafood Act [hereinafter “SAFE Seafood
Act”], H.R. 6200, 112th Cong. (2012) (reintroduced on Mar. 6, 2013 as H.R. 1012).
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The so-called SAFE Act contains proposals that may address some
of the criticism of the current federal regulatory approach described
above. The bill defines “seafood fraud” as the mislabeling or
misrepresentation of seafood information required under this Act or other
applicable federal laws and regulations.208 The Act may increase
inspections of imported seafood by requiring that FDA inspectors also
include seafood fraud in their inspections for seafood safety violations,
requiring the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to execute a memorandum of understanding to
improve interagency cooperation and establish procedures for increasing
the number of local, state, and federal officials authorized to conduct
seafood fraud and safety inspections and increasing cooperation between
NOAA and FDA on said inspections.209
The Act also has the potential to address the problem of standardized
lists and data through two provisions: first, the Act requires HHS
Secretary, in consultation with Secretary of Commerce, to update and
improve its list of standardized names for seafood and ensure that the list
is accurate and publicly available.210 Second, the Act requires data
already required to be collected by U.S. fishermen on species, production
method (gear type, farmed, or wild), geographic catch area, and weight
or number of fish to stay with the seafood through processing,
distribution, and sale, and requires equivalent data to accompany
imported seafood.211
However, the Act has received no subsequent legislative action after
being referred to committee.212 That said, recent news suggests
momentum and activism is continuing to build and support is coalescing
behind Markey’s bill.213 For example, Robert Vanasse, the Executive
Director of Saving Seafood, a nonprofit group funded by the domestic
fishing industry, publicly noted how Congress is in a better position than
states and localities to deal with seafood labeling because the “problem
isn’t a local fisherman calling one thing something else,” he said.214 “It’s
208. Id. § 7(3).
209. Id. § 2(a).
210. Id.§ 2(a)(5).
211. Id. § 2(c).
212. SAFE Seafood Act, H.R. 1012, 113th Cong. (2013) (referred to committee on
Mar. 11, 2013 with no subsequent action).
213. Bruce Smith, Bills Crack Down on Seafood Labeling: State and U.S. Legislators
are Concerned That Consumers are Paying for Fresh and Local but Getting Old and
PRESS
HERALD,
Apr.
13,
2014,
Imported,
PORTLAND
http://www.pressherald.com/politics/Bills_crack_down_on_seafood_labeling_.html.
214. Id.
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imports being called domestic.”215 Further, Oceana’s ocean advocate
Beckie Zisser said the group is hopeful the SAFE seafood bill will be
approved, saying it has bipartisan support in Congress and regional
support from groups around the nation, including fishermen.216
B. Presidential Task Force
In response to the investigations revealing seafood fraud and
criticism of the current regulatory approach to addressing it, on June 17,
2014, the White House released a presidential memorandum:
“Establishing a Comprehensive Framework to Combat Illegal,
Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud.”217 The
established task force consists of representatives from most of the
agencies discussed above and directed them to propose recommendations
for implementing a comprehensive framework of integrated programs to
combat seafood fraud.218 In early 2015, the task force recommended
several strategies that generally call for increased cooperation between
state and local U.S. agencies and international partners, and they also call
for a risk-based traceability program.219
Given that a lack of cooperation is one of the major reasons the
current food safety regime inadequately addresses seafood fraud, a call
for cooperation between not only federal agencies, but also between state
and local players is encouraging. Overall, the task force shows promise
but requires a sustained effort by the President, implementation through
executive orders or rulemaking, and funding.220 Further, the task force
appears to be an effort coordinated by NOAA and the NMFS, agencies
with which FDA has previously failed to collaborate effectively with
regarding seafood import oversight.221 At the time of this comment’s

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Presidential Memorandum, Establishing a Comprehensive Framework to Combat
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud, GPO (Jun. 17, 2014),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201400464/pdf/DCPD-201400464.pdf.
218. Recommendations of the Presidential Task Force, 79 Fed. Reg. at 75537.
219. Id.
220. Shiva Polefka & Michael Conathan, Fighting Fraudulent Fishing, Center for
American Progress, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, Oct. 9, 2014, available at
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2014/10/09/98640/fightingfraudulent-fishing/ (“Addressing these challenges will require sustained pressure from the
highest levels to keep interagency partners focused and working constructively together,
not simply protecting turf.”).
221. See supra Part II.B.3.
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publication, task force comments and recommendations were to be
finalized sometime in early 2015.222
In short, it remains unclear whether the proposals of the Act or the
recommendation of the task force can address the problems raised above.
Regardless of the policy strategy, this comment proposes that the key to
gaining the resources and attention necessary to address the inadequacy
of the current federal approach to seafood fraud is for advocates to
change the conversation about seafood fraud effects from one of
economic or environmental effects to the food safety threat. FDA seems
to give seafood fraud backburner treatment based on this mistaken belief
this is not a food safety issue. A greater focus on the food safety aspects,
particularly the risk to human health, will exert more pressure on FDA to
take action using the tools it has so far neglected. Recognizing a uniform
approach is unlikely in the near future, this at least could build the
coalition of support and energy needed to pass bills like SAFE that can
help encourage agency cooperation. Until then, consumers navigating
the path from hook to fork may continue to struggle to know when tuna
is tuna.

222. See Recommendations of the Presidential Task Force, 79 Fed. Reg. at 75537.

